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WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW FOR?  
Harlan Grant Cohen* 
Abstract:   
Events of the past few years, including the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom and the demise of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
and election of Donald Trump as President in the United States, have reignited debates about the global trade regime.  In 
particular, many have begun to question whether the trade regime has done enough for those who feel left behind by 
globalization.  While some have held fast to the view that redistribution of trade’s gains is primarily a matter of domestic policy, 
others have suggested tweaks to the international trade agreements aimed at better spreading the wealth. 
But what if the problem isn’t policy, but principle?  The major international economic institutions of the last few decades have 
been based on and around a normative principle of “growing the pie” and “raising all boats.”  Most policy tweaks that have been 
suggested assume this neoliberal principle, even while trying to soften it harder edges.  But it’s not clear that those voting against 
trade agreements agree. 
This essay reconsiders the normative basis of international economic law, searching for a new narrative that can reopen and 
reinvigorate trade politics while justifying and directing the regime going forward.  Surveying various normative narratives put 
forward in the past, it asks what an embedded liberalism might look like in an era of complex transnational supply chains.  It 
suggests that an international economic order built around a state’s obligations to provide for the welfare of its people might need 
to reorient around other policy issues like tax and regulations, shifting trade from the driver to passenger in international 
negotiations. 
                                                 
* Gabriel M. Wilner/UGA Foundation Professor in International Law, University of Georgia School of Law.  Thank you 
to Gregory Shaffer, M.J. Durkee, Tim Meyer, Reuven Avi-Yonah, Nicolas Lamp, Mona Pinchis-Paulsen, Joshua Barkan, 
Julian Arato, Ben Heath, Matjaz Nahtigal, Thomas Streinz, and participants in the UC Irvine Reconceiving Trade 
Agreements for Social Inclusion Workshop, the ESIL International Economic Law Workshop, and the Brooklyn Law 
International Business Law Roundtable for their insightful thoughts and comments.  Thanks also to Lauren Brown, 
Steven Zavodnick, and Dana Lohrberg for their vital research assistance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Events of the past few years, including the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom1 and the demise of the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)2 and election of Donald Trump as President in the United States,3 have 
reignited debates about the global trade regime.  With anti-trade populism seemingly on the rise in Europe 
and the United States, many have begun to question whether the trade regime has done enough for those 
who feel left behind by globalization.4  While some have held fast to the view that redistribution of trade’s 
gains is primarily a matter of domestic policy,5 others have suggested tweaks to international trade agreements 
aimed at better spreading the wealth.6 
But what if the problem isn’t policy, but principle?  The major international economic institutions of 
the last few decades have been based on and around a normative principle of “growing the pie” and “raising 
all boats.”7  Free-er trade will make every state better off, we explain and are told.  Most policy tweaks that 
have been suggested assume this neoliberal principle, even while trying to soften its harder edges.8  But it’s 
not clear that those in the United States and Europe voting against trade agreements agree.   
This essay reconsiders the normative narrative underlying international trade law.  The prevailing 
narrative of “growing the pie” and “raising all boats” plays a key role in international trade law.  It explains 
why free trade should be pursued and justifies the existing multilateral trading system.  It directs 
interpretations of existing trade rules and guides negotiations towards deeper liberalization.  It justifies why 
                                                 
1 Anushka Asthana, Ben Quinn, & Rowena Mason, UK Votes to Leave EU After Dramatic Night Divides Nation, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jun 24, 2016).  
2 See Adam Davidson, What the Death of the T.P.P. Means for America, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 23, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/business/adam-davidson/what-the-death-of-the-t-p-p-means-for-america.  Although the 
United States withdrew its signature from the TPP, the other 11 states were able to reach a new agreement, re-titled the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).  See CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L 
STUDIES, From TPP to CPTPP (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/tpp-cptpp.   
3 Matt Flegenheimer & Michael Barbaro, Donald Trump is Elected President in Stunning Repudiation of the Establishment, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016). 
4 See, e.g., Dani Rodrik, Populism and the Economics of Globalization, J. OF INT’L BUS. POL’Y 12, 13-16 (June 2018) 
(summarizing the negative effects of trade liberalization on advanced economies’ labor markets) [hereinafter Rodrik, 
Populism]; Betsy Cooper et al., How Immigration and Concerns About Cultural Changes are Shaping the 2016 Election, PRRI 
/BROOKINGS INST. 2016 IMMIGRATION SURVEY (Jun. 26, 2016), https://www.prri.org/research/prri-brookings-poll-
immigration-economy-trade-terrorism-presidential-race/ (“A majority (52%) of the public says that free trade 
agreements with other countries are mostly harmful because they send U.S. jobs overseas and drive down wages.”).  
5 See, e.g., generally, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, & World Trade Organization, Making Trade an Engine of 
Growth for All: The Case for Trade and for Policies to Facilitate Adjustment, Apr 10, 2017, 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/wto_imf_report_07042017.pdf.  
6 See e.g., Gregory Shaffer, Retooling Trade Agreements for Social Inclusion, 2019 ILL. L. REV. 1 (2019); Timothy Meyer, Saving 
the Political Consensus in Favor of Free Trade, 70 VAND. L. REV. 985, 1014-20 (2017) (proposing that free trade agreements 
include an “Economic Development Obligations” chapter to soften the domestic loses from trade liberalization) 
[hereinafter Meyer, Saving the Political Consensus]. 
7 These two formulations are actually a bit different in that the first makes no assumption about how benefits will be 
distributed, but the second suggests that everyone benefits.  In that sense, the latter is more pernicious as it hides the 
very real distributional questions inherent in liberalizing trade. 
8 See, e.g., David H. Autor, David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to 
Large Changes in Trade, 8 ANNUAL REV. ECON. 205, 235 (2016) (arguing that in order to realize the “ultimate and sizeable 
net gain” from trade, new ideas must be set forth to hasten “the speed of regional labor-market adjustment.”). 
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some benefit and others may not.  Most of all, the prevailing neoliberal narrative structures trade politics, 
dictating which topics are debated, by which actors, in which fora, and according to what logics.   As will be 
explained, it separates trade policy from questions of fair distribution and domestic social welfare.  
But there is nothing inherent about the prevailing normative narrative.  Over time, other stories have 
been told about trade’s purpose, producing different policies and encouraging different politics.  And with 
many voters questioning the normative force of simply growing the pie, it is fair to ask whether a different 
narrative, with a different normative vision might better balance the benefits of trade with the demands of 
trade law’s discontents. 
After describing the current neoliberal narrative, the role it plays in structuring the trade regime, and 
the various critiques it faces, this essay continues on to survey various competing normative narratives put 
forward in the present and past.  Considering demands for a trade law more attuned to questions of 
distribution, more sensitive to other regulatory concerns, and more responsive to the broader public, the 
essay reconsiders the narratives of embedded liberalism and economic rights that emerged following World 
War II and found form in the original Bretton Woods Institutions and human rights treaties, respectively.  
Distilling from those institutions a narrative structured around a state’s obligations to provide for the welfare 
of its people, the essay imagines a restructured politics and policy of trade that would tie trade policy to 
domestic policy goals, rather than the other way around.  It would re-embed trade policy within domestic 
political decisions about labor policy, redistribution, consumer protection, the digital economy, and the 
environment, integrating trade into broader policy debates and yoking trade’s benefits to those policy ends. 
In its final part, this essay imagines what international negotiations based on such a narrative – 
negotiations towards what might be called “cooperative capability promotion” – might look like.  Among 
others things, it suggests that in a world of complex transnational supply chains, an international economic 
order built around a state’s obligations to provide for the welfare of its people might need to reorient around 
other policy issues like tax and regulations, shifting trade from the driver to passenger in international 
negotiations.9  It might also need to focus as much on trading policy flexibilities as on deeper liberalization.10 
Many changes to trade policy are currently on the table, some economically and/or politically sound, 
some not.  What’s required is a normative narrative capable of directing and justifying choices between and 
among them.  That’s where this essay hopes to intervene.       
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Bernard Hoekman and Douglas Nelson, 21st Century Trade Agreements and the Owl of Minerva, European 
University Institute Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Global Governance Programme Working Paper 
RSCAS 2018/04 at 12. 
10 See DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 163-
74 (2011). 
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II. THE MIRAGE OF CONSENSUS 
For many who had become complacent in a narrative of ever-increasing trade liberalization through 
broader agreements and deeper integration, the apparent victory of trade liberalization’s opponents came as 
something of surprise.  While the victories of Trump and the Brexit movement were shocking, the death of 
American support for the TPP was even more telling.  In less than a year, the TPP had gone from a key 
Obama administration objective barreling towards ratification, 11  to a political outcast, disavowed by the 
presidential candidates of both major parties.12  Few politicians seemed willing to argue for it;13 too few 
Americans seemed interested in traditional justifications for liberalizing trade, like growing the economic pie 
to everyone’s advantage.14  Somewhat bizarrely, it was left to an imperfect messenger, the Prime Minister of 
Singapore, to make the traditional arguments about the welfare gains to Americans of lower priced 
products.15  The demise of the TPP thus demonstrated the depth to which support for liberalized trade had 
cratered.  The arguments for liberalized trade simply weren’t resonating. 
And why would they?  Certainly there were sectors that were set to benefit, like dairy farmers and 
finance,16 but for many, the promised economic benefits were no more than an idea, difficult to translate into 
pocketbook benefits or increased opportunities. 17   And for those who had already seen jobs and 
opportunities disappear in the wake of prior trade deals,18 those abstract ideas were more false promises.  
                                                 
11 See Shawn Donnan, Negotiators Strike Pacific Trade Deal, CNBC (Oct. 5, 2015), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/05/tpp-negotiators-strike-pacific-trade-deal.html; Paul Lewis, Barack Obama Given 
“Fast-Track” Authority Over Trade Deal Negotiations, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 24, 2015). 
12 See Read Donald Trump’s Speech on Trade, TIME (Jun. 28, 2016), http://time.com/4386335/donald-trump-trade-speech-
transcript/ (“The Trans-Pacific Partnership is the greatest danger yet. The TPP, as it is known, would be the death blow 
for American manufacturing.” quoting Donald Trump, Speech on Trade, Monessen, Penn.); Russell Berman, Hillary 
Clinton Abandons Obama on Trade, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 7, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/10/hillary-clinton-abandons-obama-on-trade/409546/ (“Hillary 
Clinton is now officially against President Obama’s enormous trade agreement with 11 Pacific Rim nations. . . .”). 
13 See Daniel W. Drezner, Will Congress approve the Trans-Pacific Partnership?, WASH. POST, October 6, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/10/06/will-congress-approve-the-trans-pacific-
partnership/?utm_term=.c18d5881b3fc (“I tried to find a positive congressional statement about TPP. It wasn't easy.”); 
Jackie Calmes, T.P.P. Faces Rough Road in Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/02/business/international/pacific-trade-pact-faces-rough-road-in-congress.html. 
14 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., CLINTON, TRUMP SUPPORTERS HAVE STARKLY DIFFERENT VIEWS OF A CHANGING 
NATION 27-30 (Aug. 2016) (summarizing survey respondents’ views of TPP and free trade agreements generally). 
15 Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Lee of Singapore in Joint Press Conference, The White House, 
Office of the Press Secretary, August 02, 2016, available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2016/08/02/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-lee-singapore-joint-press (“Can I say something about 
the TPP?...”). 
16 Matthew Yglesias, The Real Reason Wall Street Loves the Trans-Pacific Partnership, VOX (Nov. 11, 2015), 
https://www.vox.com/2015/11/11/9706360/tpp-financial-services; Rajeshni Naidu-Ghelani, TPP Trade Deal: Who are 
the Winners and Losers? BBC NEWS (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-34451423. 
17 See Nathaniel Popper, How Much Do We Really Know About Global Trade’s Impacts? N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/magazine/how-much-do-we-really-know-about-global-trades-impacts.html 
(“For all the talk about winners and losers in the global trading game, an actual accounting of what’s happening on the 
winning side overseas is surprisingly elusive.”). 
18 See Autor, Dorn & Hanson, supra note 8 at 228 (“Estimates of the net impact of aggregate demand and reallocation 
effects imply that import growth from China between 1999 and 2011 led to an employment 
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Previous promises that they would share in the benefits of trade liberalization had not been fulfilled; why 
should they believe that these new ones would?   
In some sense this shouldn’t have been surprising. Since the massive protests surrounding the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference of 1999, the “Battle of Seattle,”19 it had become clear that 
a wide range of groups—organized labor, 20  environmentalists, 21  etc.—are skeptical of the neoliberal 
consensus.  The neoliberal argument that liberalization raises all boats and grows the global pie falls short in 
their view.22  The neoliberal agenda is blind to the other interests that were being trampled in the rush 
towards faster and deeper globalization.  
For the past decade and half, the response to these concerns has been “policy space.”  Trade 
liberalization’s proponents would sand down the harshest edges of trade liberalization, by guaranteeing that, 
at the very least, trade did not stand in the way of legitimate efforts to achieve those other goals.23  Policy 
space took a number of forms.  It might mean a loosening of WTO rules to allow space for environmental 
policies that restricted trade, as in the WTO Appellate Body’s decision in Shrimp-Turtle. 24   It might 
alternatively take the form of various additional chapters or side agreements to trade agreements on 
development, labor, or the environment.25 
This new, modified consensus, a sort-of neo-liberalism-lite, came though with a couple of serious 
caveats.  First, efforts to achieve those other goals had to be neutral with regard to trade.  Trade could be 
affected by those efforts, but it couldn’t be the target of those efforts.  Protectionism was unacceptable.  This 
                                                                                                                                                             
reduction of 2.4 million workers.”). 
19 See John Burgess & Steven Pearlstein, Protests Delay WTO Opening, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 1999), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPcap/1999-12/01/089r-120199-idx.html (“A guerrilla army of anti-trade 
protesters took control of downtown Seattle today, forcing the delay of the opening of a global meeting of the World 
Trade Organization.”). 
20 See, e.g., AFL-CIO, TRADE, https://aflcio.org/issues/trade (last visited Aug. 7, 2018) (“International trade is a vital 
part of the U.S. economy. But, too often, powerful corporate interests have negotiated trade deals in secret; stacking the 
deck in their favor to increase profits for the biggest and most unscrupulous corporations at the expense of working 
people.”). 
21 See, e.g., SIERRA CLUB, RESPONSIBLE TRADE, https://www.sierraclub.org/trade (last visited Aug. 7, 2018) (“For more 
than two decades, the Sierra Club's Responsible Trade Program has shed light on the threats that the status quo 
corporate trade model poses to people and our planet. Most recently, we worked with progressive allies to help defeat 
the toxic Trans-Pacific Partnership.”) 
22 See AFL-CIO, JOINT STATEMENT BY THE AFL-CIO AND ETUC ON FAIR TRADE PRACTICES, June 15, 2018, 
https://aflcio.org/2018/6/15/afl-cio-and-etuc-support-fair-trade-practices (criticizing the present global trade 
framework as “increasingly captured by the interests of global corporations and the failed ideology of neoliberalism.”). 
23 See Rodrik, How to Save Globalization from its Cheerleaders, John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Working 
Paper Series at *20, available at https://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/files/how-to-save-globalization-
from-cheerleaders.pdf (asking “how do we create the policy space for nations to handle the problems that openness 
creates.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
24 Appellate Body Report, United States--Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998); Appellate Body Report, United States--Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia), paras. 135-38, 153-54, 
WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001). 
25 See Meyer, Saving the Political Consensus, supra note 6, at 1002-08; Kathleen Claussen, Reimagining Trade+ Enforcement 
Institutions (unpublished paper on file with author). 
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is most visible in Appellate Body jurisprudence on the scope of exceptions to GATT rules.  Second, by 
emphasizing policy space, the new consensus left it to others to enact policies that would forward other goals, 
including the promised redistribution of trade’s gains. 
The result of this neo-liberalism-lite consensus has, at best, been a sort of half-hearted pluralism, at 
worst, a nonchalant disregard.  What has become clear though is that there is no guarantee that that domestic 
redistribution will happen.26  Structural features of current politics, including its treatment of international 
trade as a topic separate from domestic economic welfare, play a key role.27  This has led to a variety of 
proposals to shake-up those political structures to put those domestic concerns on more even footing with 
the advocates of expanding trade.28 
Nonetheless, these suggestions always fall back on the existing logic.  The argument is about “saving 
trade”—thus accepting and forwarding the neoliberal normative consensus that growing the pie is a global 
and local good, one worth pursuing, the goal of international economic policy. 
But for those who disagree, or fall outside this supposed consensus, these efforts will always fall 
short.  What’s needed is a new consensus, a different normative justification for international trade law that 
can better capture the demands of those who have felt ignored and left behind.    
III. TRADE LAW’S NORMATIVE NARRATIVE 
What does it mean to talk about trade law or international economic law’s “normative narrative”?  
Policies and legal regimes depend on normative narratives.29  Shared narratives help justify the legal regime to 
those who live with and under it, thus embedding the rules within a particular society and its politics.30  They 
provide principles that guide practitioners in their interpretation of that regime’s rules, suggesting answers 
that better fit the goals or values that rules are meant to achieve.31  As such, shared normative narratives also 
support the coherence of the rules in a particular regime, 32 stringing them together as part of a logical 
whole.33  By providing coherence and distinguishing rule from arbitrary exercises of sovereign authority, these 
narratives also contribute to the perceived legitimacy of the regime.34 
                                                 
26 See Stefanie Walter, Globalization and the Welfare State: Testing the Microfoundations of the Compensation Hypothesis, 54 INT’L 
STUDIES QUARTERLY 403, 404 (2010) (summarizing economics and political science research to conclude that “[t]he jury 
is still out” on whether “higher [global economic] integration coincides with bigger welfare states. . . .”). 
27 See infra notes 50-63 and accompanying text. 
28 See Timothy Meyer, Misaligned Lawmaking in International Trade, 38-41 (Feb. 2018) (on file with the author) [hereinafter 
Meyer, Misaligned Lawmaking] (setting forth three proposals to better “align trade liberalization with the redistribution 
that trade liberalization makes necessary.”). 
29 See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
30 See Hoekman and Nelson, supra note 9, at 14-18. 
31 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 254-58 (1986).  Cf. Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies 
Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45 (2013) (describing how competing narratives structure the rules 
of investor-state arbitration). 
32 See Thomas M Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 705, 712 (1988). 
33 See DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 176-224 (on “law as integrity” and the problem of “checkerboard statutes”). 
34 See, e.g., LON L FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964). 
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These shared normative narratives exist at the nexus between moral theory and politics.35  While they 
draw from theories of justice to develop a political justification for a particular set of rules, they may only 
loosely follow those theories, oftentimes finding common narratives, a type of normative consensus across a 
number of contested ideas about what just or good policies might require.  
To put it another way, normative narratives present a type of political-moral conventional wisdom.  
These narratives capture the basic, shared understanding of why a policy is worthwhile.  In the case of trade, 
these narratives help explain why in a political-moral sense, trade liberalization is worth pursuing.  They 
provide a political-moral story of what trade law and policy should look like and why.  And when effective, 
these narratives thus help tether or embed the global economy within civil society or politics, resolving the 
tensions between state, economy, and civil society noted by Jürgen Habermas or between nation state, hyper-
globalization, and democratic politics described by Dani Rodrik.36 
Over the past few decades, neoliberal ideas have provided the shared normative narrative supporting 
free trade agreements.  The starting point of that story is the accepted wisdom within economics that free 
trade makes all parties better off.  Protectionism, the narrative argues, is usually misguided. It may be aimed at 
helping domestic workers, but it actually has the opposite effect, raising prices, stifling growth, and shrinking 
the domestic economy.37  The Great Depression, is, in this narrative, the cautionary tale—the exemplar of 
what happens when states turn to protectionism.38  Trade liberalization, on the other hand, while perhaps 
causing transitional pain to domestic industries and workers, encourages growth, and through the magic of 
comparative advantage, increases the overall welfare of all states, giving each state more wealth to allocate 
among its population.39  Free-er trade grows the global and national pie and can make everyone better off.   
This narrative, of course, recognizes that trade liberalization will not in-and-of itself better the lives 
or fortunes of everyone.40  It assumes, however, that questions about the redistribution of the welfare gains 
of trade are best (from a political legitimacy standpoint) and most efficiently (from an economics standpoint) 
                                                 
35 The value of a normative narrative is its ability to recast popular views in terms of a theory of justice, atheory of justice 
which can in turn point those views and policies based on them in a particular direction.  
36 See Hoekman and Nelson, supra note 9. 
37 See, e.g., Robert Z. Lawrence & Robert E. Litan, Why Protectionism Doesn’t Pay, HARV. BUS. REV. 60, 61 (May 1987) 
(arguing that protectionist policies “seldom save jobs for long or preserve the competitiveness of the industry to be 
‘saved.’ Meanwhile . . . the consumer suffers through higher prices.”). 
38 See Barry Eichengreen & Douglas Irwin, The Protectionist Temptation: Lessons from the Great Depression for Today, VOX (Mar. 
17, 2009) https://voxeu.org/article/protectionist-temptation-lessons-great-depression-today (While many aspects of the 
Great Depression continue to be debated, there is all-but-universal agreement that the adoption of restrictive trade 
policies was destructive and counterproductive. . . .”). 
39 See Paul Krugman, Is Free Trade Passé? 1 ECON. PERSPECTIVES 131 (Fall 1987) (“For one hundred seventy years, the 
appreciation that international trade benefits a country whether it is ‘fair’ or not has been one of the touchstones of 
professionalism in economics.”); JOOST PAUWELYN, ANDREW GUZMAN, & JENNIFER HILLMAN EDS., INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE LAW 11-19 (3rd ed. 2016). 
40 See Making Trade an Engine of Growth for All, supra note 5, at 24. 
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answered through domestic, rather than international, policymaking.41  Moreover, suggests this narrative, to 
the extent that liberalized trade does redistribute domestic wealth in its own right, it often redistributes it to 
the least well off, who have the most welfare to gain from lower-priced goods.42  The shorthand for this 
narrative is that “trade grows the overall pie” or “trade raises all boats.”           
As a political-moral narrative it is neither fully a matter of economics, nor of political philosophy, 
even as it draws from both.  This narrative draws heavily from accepted wisdom with regard to economic 
efficiency and reflects much of the neoliberal consensus about market governance that emerged in the early 
1980’s and which has come to dominate international economic policy over the past few decades.43  But it is 
neither co-terminus with it, nor entirely dependent on it.  The neoliberal consensus involves a suite of ideas 
about trade, investment, monetary, competition, and regulatory policies.44  One need not accept all of those 
to accept the more rough-and-ready narrative that free-er trade grows the pie. 
Of course, liberalized trade is often justified to policymakers and the public on other bases.  Bringing 
China into the WTO may encourage rule of law or enmesh that regime in global prosperity in ways that 
would make future political or military conflict less likely.45  TPP would anchor the United States in the Asia-
Pacific, guaranteeing that it could continue to compete there against China.46  TPP would allow the United 
States, rather than China, to set the regulatory ground-rules for 21st century trade.47  More broadly, the rules 
and institutions of international trade, the WTO, for example, lower the likelihood of trade wars by ensuring 
predictability, fostering transparency, promoting cooperation and consultations, and encouraging rule-based 
dispute settlement.48  These narratives though generally play a secondary role in justifying trade liberalization 
and are much more powerful among policymakers and trade specialists than among the public at large. 
Trade law’s normative narrative is not just a matter of political messaging, though it very much is 
that.  The normative narrative directs trade law policy, putting a thumb on the scales in favor of certain types 
of agreements, covering certain subjects, and using specific rules.  The growing-the-overall-pie narrative, for 
                                                 
41 See, e.g., PAUL KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY & POLICY 214-17 (7th ed. 
2005). 
42 See, e.g., Pablo D. Fajgelbaum & Amit K. Khandelwal, Measuring the Unequal Gains from Trade, 131 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 
1113 (2016). 
43 Miguel A. Centeno & Joseph N. Cohen, The Arc of Neoliberalism, 38 ANNUAL REV. OF SOCIOLOGY 317, 317 (2012); 
DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 163-74 
(2011). 
44 See Centeno & Cohen, supra note 43, at 317; Rodrik, supra note 43, at 163-74.  
45 See No Change: Chinese Politics and the WTO, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 10, 2011) (quoting President Clinton predicting that 
China’s admission to the WTO “was likely to have ‘a profound impact on human rights and political liberty.’”). 
46 See Mireya Solis, The Case for Trade and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 4, 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-trans-pacific-partnership-the-politics-of-openness-and-leadership-in-the-asia-
pacific/.  
47 See id. (arguing that ratification of the TPP accomplishes U.S. strategic goals in Asia by providing for “a smart strategy 
vis-à-vis China’s regional and global leadership bid by using trade policy in proactive ways (covering governance gaps) 
and inclusive ways (contemplating a future Chinese accession).”). 
48 See generally Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 303 (2004).  See also Shaffer, supra 
note 6, at 4-8. 
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example, explains why major international economic agreements are first and foremost, “trade” agreements, 
handed primarily to trade bureaucrats to negotiate and draft.  Particularly now that such agreements contain 
provisions on investment, regulation, the environment, and labor, others have a voice, but trade diplomats 
and trade lawyers hold the pen.  The growing-the-pie narrative also defines the policy and the exception.  For all 
the space that has been opened in more recent trade agreements for development, human rights, and the 
environment, that space is always designed as exceptional, an acceptable exception from the logic of 
liberalization.  The narrative guarantees that such exceptions are seen with a skeptical eye; every exception 
might be protectionism in disguise and each exception must be balanced against the cost to the overall pie of 
throwing up specific barriers.  The current normative narrative thus helps explain why many of the exceptions 
built into the WTO agreements have been construed narrowly.49 
But the normative narrative also constructs the political space in which trade law policy is made and 
debated.50  It defines who is interested and who has a voice in the development of the rules.  It constructs 
economists and business leaders as policy-insiders; if the goal is economic growth, who would have more 
expertise?51  But the closed nature of trade politics is part of the current dilemma.  To the extent various 
policies that have been suggested or proposed over the years to help rebalance trade’s benefits, for example, 
robust job search assistance and training programs, income support and social insurance,52 seem politically 
infeasible,53 it is because of the structure of trade politics.  Making those policies possible cannot just be a 
function of fear or politically necessary accommodation, i.e., “saving trade”54; it will need to be the product of 
a different type of political debate that rebalances the interests and values in play and with them, the players 
negotiating the terms of their accommodation. A new politics of the possible requires a new narrative of 
international economic law’s purpose. 
Many describe the current consensus as involving a two-step process.55  In step one, overall global 
welfare is grown through international trade agreements.  In step two, the distributional effects of liberalizing 
trade are dealt with through domestic policymaking.  This two-step description recognizes that liberalizing 
trade redistributes wealth, favoring some in each state over others, perhaps in ways that are normatively 
unfair.56  It assumes, however, that decisions about redistribution are best made domestically, either because 
                                                 
49 See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence, 2 WORLD TRADE REV. 261 (2003). 
50 Cf. Roberts, supra note 31. 
51 Cf. Dani Rodrik, What Do Trade Agreements Really Do?, 32 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 73, 79 (2018). 
52 See Making Trade an Engine of Growth for All, supra note 5, at 27-36.  
53 See Meyer, Misaligned Lawmaking, supra note 27, at *32-37 (citing the allure of pork barrel spending for legislators and 
the decline of labor unions as two major political impediments to a more balanced approach to trade liberalization). 
54 See Meyer, Saving the Political Consensus, supra note 6; Making Trade an Engine of Growth for All, supra note 5, at 4. 
55 See Shaffer, supra note 6, at 8, 11. 
56 See Meyer, Misaligned Lawmaking, supra note 27, at *8 (“Trade policy is inherently distributional.”). 
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those mechanisms do so more efficiently or because they require trade-offs between groups that are best left 
to domestic politics.57 
While many do hold to this two-step view, it misconstrues the actual normative consensus.  The 
current normative narrative treats growth through trade as a truism, while remaining agnostic about 
redistributive policies.  While some may say that the latter are matters for internal policy, others may be 
skeptical of government intervention.  Part of what has made the current consensus so durable is that it could 
be adopted regardless of one’s theory of domestic distributive justice.  Social democrats, Rawlsians, and 
Hayekians could all agree to grow the global and domestic pies, even as they disagreed on logics of domestic 
redistribution.   
This, however, creates a political dynamic in which the two “steps” are debated in different political 
spaces.58  Reflecting a truism, the first step, trade policy, is debated around the edges; debate focuses on the 
shape of particular deals and specific concessions or commitments.  The second step though, facing no real 
consensus about the role of government or the desirability of different types of redistribution, is subject to 
full political debate.  It is thus unsurprising that trade deals move forward even as promises of redistribution 
do not.59  The most pointed example of this disconnect in the United States has been the fate of Trade 
Adjustment Assistance (TAA). Since 1962,60 Congress has generally packaged new trade deals with TAA, 
which provides financial aid to workers, farmers, and firms hurt by competition from imports.61 As Tim 
Meyer describes, however, TAA has had none of the durability of the trade deals it shadowed.62  Seemingly 
always under threat, TAA’s funding has been at times allowed to lapse, consistently scaled back, and has over 
time become more difficult to access.63     
IV. THE BOATS TAKE ON WATER OR “LET THEM EAT PIE” 
The triumph of anti-trade politics in various countries over the past few years suggests though that 
the “grow the pie” or “raise all boats” narrative is no longer as widely shared as it once might have been.  
States’ failure to live up to the promises of redistribution associated with the second step (discussed above) 
                                                 
57 See Rodrik, How to Save Globalization, supra note 23, at *21 (The appropriate locus for their discussion and resolution is 
most likely the national polity, given the wide variety of standard and norms that prevail across the globe.”); PAUL R. 
KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 221 (7th ed. 2005) (“It is 
always preferable to deal with market failures as directly as possible.”). 
58 Cf. Kerry Rittich, Enchantments of Reason/Coercions of Law, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 727, 734 (2003) (“[T[he result is the 
separation of social and distributional concerns from the rules governing the economy.”). 
59 See Rodrik, Populism, supra note 4 at 6 (“As long as reversing trade agreements is costly, governments always have the 
incentive to promise compensation, but rarely to carry it out. The winners need the losers’ assent for the agreement. But 
once the agreement is passed, there is little reason for the winners to follow through.”); Meyer, supra note 6 at 8, 14-21 
(reviewing the history of U.S. Trade Adjustment Assistance to conclude that the “grand bargain” between trade’s 
winners and losers has been one-sided, favoring free trade’s advocates at the expense of its victims.”). 
60 TAA was first enacted as part of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. 19 U.S.C. § 2272 (2012).   
61 See Stephen Kim Park, Bridging the Global Governance Gap: Reforming the Law of Trade Adjustment, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 797, 
798 (2012). 
62 See Meyer, Misaligned Lawmaking, supra note 27. 
63 Id. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3298389 
Cohen  IILJ Working Paper 2018/6 (MegaReg Series) 
 
13 
 
have certainly contributed to this frayed consensus.  Although the connection between populist politics and 
displacement is uncertain, there is evidence that states that “retained the capacity/willingness to respond to 
labor market adjustment problems have had less problems with anti-globalist populism.”64  
But there are problems with the first step as well that the consensus has masked.  While the basic 
economic truths of comparative advantage remain uncontested, there are questions about how they map onto 
the partially liberalized trade we have and which current agreements produce. 
For one thing, the narrative underlying the grow-the-pie consensus glosses over the differential speed 
of liberalization.  As has been oft-repeated, the WTO does not call for free trade, but for liberalized trade.  
Members progressively, through negotiations, lower tariffs and eliminate other barriers to trade.  The choice 
is not and has not been between protectionism and free trade, but over the pace and scope of liberalization.  
That variably paced liberalization though increases the distributional effects of trade agreements, guaranteeing 
that certain industries are helped or hurt by further agreements and in patterns not necessarily dictated by 
pure economics.  A particular industry, for example, shoemakers, may see its tariff protection lowered,65 while 
another industry’s, say sugar, remains in place.  That first industry may also see its protections removed at a 
rate or pace that its foreign competitors do not.  Whether or not these complaints sounds in macroeconomics 
– the overall deal still likely benefits both states – it becomes harder to argue that international economic 
deals need not worry about redistribution.  International economic deals are involved in redistribution.  
The current narrative also largely ignores the different effects liberalization has on economies that are 
already more or less open.  As Dani Rodrik observes, the redistributive impact of lowering tariffs is much 
more dramatic at lower starting tariff rates than higher ones.66 Such an effect though is highly unlikely to 
register in the domestic politics of trade, where the change in policy is likely to look insignificant compared to 
the pre-existing policy.  The effects are difficult to explain without a deep dive into economics and would be 
counterintuitive to most voters.  As public choice theory predicts, the broad range of voters interested in 
domestic economic welfare and fairness will be at a severe disadvantage in the lobbying and electioneering 
space compared to the sophisticated financial and corporate backers of liberalized trade.  To assert that 
domestic policy should deal with these effects, particularly when these effects are so difficult to link to trade 
policies, seems implausible at best.  Instead, the effect is likely to go unanswered, leading to resentment and 
support for anti-trade populism.  
Further, as traditional trade barriers come down, trade agreements have moved into new areas like 
intellectual property and investment protection, where the grow-the-pie narrative is harder to tell.67  Business 
                                                 
64 Hoekman and Nelson, supra note 9, (citing Duane Swank and Hans-Georg Betz, Globalization, The Welfare State and 
Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, 1 SOCIO-ECONOMIC REV. 215 (2003)). 
65 See Tran Thu, U.S. To Lift Most Tariffs On Vietnam Footwear, SAIGON TIMES, Nov 11, 2015, 20:59 (GMT+7), 
http://english.thesaigontimes.vn/44022/US-to-lift-most-tariffs-on-Vietnam-footwear.html. 
66 Dani Rodrik, Populism and Economics of Globalization, J. of Int’l Bus. Pol’y 4 (2018). 
67 See, e,g,, Dani Rodrik, What Do Trade Agreements Really Do?, 32 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 73, 82-88 (2018). 
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interests have always been present in the mind of trade negotiators, but in these new areas, they seem 
dominant. 68   The resulting agreements look to many more like attempts at rent-seeking by particular 
companies or industries than the type of shared growth and benefits associated with prior agreements.69 
And finally, the “policy space” strategy of the past two decades has not fully answered the concerns 
of those who fought in the Battle of Seattle.  Some still question the basic moral positions embedded in the 
neoliberal narrative, refusing to accept that economic efficiency should take priority over protecting the 
environment, promoting basic human rights, adopting democratically legitimate health and safety regulations, 
or achieving greater equity across countries.  Their problem isn’t with the economic truth of comparative 
advantage, but with whether that truth should trump all other priorities. 
V. ALTERNATIVE NORMATIVITIES? 
But what are the alternatives?  The neoliberal “grow-the-pie,” “raise-all-boats” narrative has come 
over the past few decades to seem almost a truism.  (A colleague, responding to the central question of this 
essay, described the current narrative as “physics.”)  But that narrative is not eternal nor has it been 
uncontested.  Various scholars have over the decades attempted to develop theories of justice that might 
guide international trade agreements, with more or less radical conclusions on how trade law might be 
reorganized.70  And Samuel Moyn has richly described the varied narratives of social welfare and economic 
rights that vied for acceptance from the French revolution until the ascendancy of neoliberalism.71  The New 
International Economic Order (NIEO)—the 1970s campaign by non-aligned movement and developing 
countries to argue for a more equitable distribution of global wealth across countries72—is only the most 
remembered of the many normative narratives that have been tried out over time. 
The anti-trade campaigns of the past two years might be seen as groping towards their own 
alternative narratives.73  We might distill a couple of different alternatives from the anti-trade campaigns of 
the past two years.  On one side, idealized, might be a type of neo-mercantilism associated most closely with 
Donald Trump and the populist right.74  In this view, trade is a zero-sum competition for resources between 
                                                 
68 See id. at 84. 
69 See generally id. 
70 See, e.g., OISIN SUTTLE, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND WORLD TRADE LAW 37-48 (2018) (describing theories). 
71 See generally SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD (2018). 
72 For a discussion, see, e.g., ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM: REIMAGINING THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMIC ORDER 44-52 (2011); Diane A. Desierto, Postcolonial International Law Discourses On Regional Developments In 
South And Southeast Asia, 36 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 387, 402-05 (2008).  
73 For the best description of the claims being made in current populist anti-trade campaigns and how those claims 
might translate into policy changes, see Nicolas Lamp, How Should We Think about the Winners and Losers from Globalization? 
Three Narratives and their Implications for the Redesign of International Economic Agreements, (November, 26 2018),  available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3290590. 
74 See Binyamin Appelbaum, On Trade, Donald Trump Breaks With 200 Years of Economic Orthodoxy, N.Y. Times (Mar. 10, 
2016) https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/11/us/politics/-trade-donald-trump-breaks-200-years-economic-orthodoxy-
mercantilism.html (“Mr. Trump’s mercantilism is among his oldest and steadiest public positions. Since at least the 
1980s, he has described trade as a zero-sum game in which countries lose by paying for imports.”). 
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states, in which global, multilateral rules serve only to unfairly shackle entrepreneurial and enterprising 
states.75  States should be free to make the best deals they can (or to act unilaterally if they have to) to 
maximize their own share of the spoils.  One might term this alternative, the “you get what you take” theory 
of trade, a normative belief that the best competitors (not in the market, but in trade warfare) should be 
rewarded with the greatest share of the spoils.76  (Belief in this theory generally goes along with a belief that 
your state is the one being hurt by the rules and would benefit from a less regulated street-fight.)  Nicolas 
Lamp, in a careful, subtle reading of President Trump’s rhetoric, finds a story of jobs as property, earned by, 
stolen from, and soon to be recaptured by American workers.77  On the populist left, a different theory of 
fairness emerges, one focused more on the distribution of wealth between labor and capital and worried 
about regulatory leakage.78  On the one hand, “fair trade,” should guarantee benefits not only to corporations 
and bankers, but workers as well.79  On the other hand, it should guarantee against a race-to-the bottom, 
where progressive regulations with regard to labor and the environment put workers at a competitive 
disadvantage.80  This latter vision might be seen as a more robust version of the neo-liberalism-lite that has 
been the dominant policy over the past two decades and reflected in the labor, environmental, development, 
and human rights chapters that have been added to the more recent free trade agreements.81 
The first alternative vision may resonate with many disaffected voters, as evidenced by the victories 
of Donald Trump in the United States and Brexit in the United Kingdom.82  It is unclear that the second 
alternative vision, while perhaps popular among liberal elites, has popular purchase.  It seems to suffer from 
its inherent vagueness.  It’s never entirely clear what the “fair” in “fair trade” means or the metric along 
which fairness is to be measured.83  Calls for fair trade risk sounding too weak, in which case, it might sound 
                                                 
75 See id. (“[Mr. Trump] described trade as a zero-sum game in which countries lose by paying for imports.”). 
76 Cf. Lamp, supra note 73, (May 18, 2018) (on file with the author) (concluding that Mr. Trump “attributes [U.S. job 
losses] to the ‘unfair’ rules of international trade agreements and to the ineptitude of US politicians and trade negotiators 
who have failed to level the playing field for US producers.”) 
77 See id. at 4-10. 
78 See, e.g., Christopher McCrudden & Anne Davies, A Perspective on Trade and Labor Rights, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 43, 49 
(2000). 
79 Cf. Antonia Eliason, Development and Regional Trade Agreements: Entrenching Structural Inequities, 46 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
636, 646 (2018) (“Using this framing, the division becomes not one between the Global  South  and  the  Global  North,  
but  one  between  the  transnational  capitalist  class  and  those  that  do  not  benefit  from  the  financial  gains  of  
late  capitalism.”). 
80 See, e.g., Charles B. Rangel, Moving Forward: A New, Bipartisan Trade Policy That Reflects American Values, 45 HARVARD J. 
ON LEGIS. 377, 394 (2008). 
81 See, e.g., EUROPEAN UNION – SINGAPORE TRADE AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS (Apr. 18, 2018), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961 (including a chapter on Trade and Sustainable Development); 
U.S.-KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Mar. 15, 2012) https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/korus-fta/final-text (containing sections on labor and the environment); NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT 
ON LABOR COOPERATION (Sept. 1993), https://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/naalcgd.htm (labor side 
agreement to NAFTA).  See also Kathleen Claussen, Dispute Settlement Under The Next Generation Of Free Trade Agreements, 
46 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 611, 618 (2018). 
82 See supra notes 1, 2 & accompanying text. 
83 See Andrew Walton, What is Fair Trade? 31 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 431, 431 (2010) (“[T]here is a lack of clarity 
regarding how we should conceptualise Fair Trade.”). 
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to many like more of the same empty, unenforceable promises of post-1999 neo-liberalism-lite, or too strong, 
in which they sound either like a rejection of all future trade agreements or less pugnacious version of the 
neo-mercantilist vision of the populist right. 
Traditional advocates of liberalized trade and free trade agreements have mostly responded by 
doubling-down on the grow-the-pie narrative, arguing that simmering discontent is a result of step-two 
domestic political failures84 and politicians’ failures to properly communicate free trade’s benefits.85  Some 
though have grasped for alternative narratives that might support the system, leaning into usually secondary 
arguments for free trade, like the argument that free trade encourages peace, security, and alliances by 
enmeshing like-minded states and encouraging rules-based dispute settlement86 or that free trade encourages 
transnational solidarity by creating points of contact and cultural exchange.87  The allure of these narratives is 
that they make now-contested economic arguments besides-the-point.  Support trade to protect national 
security!  Support trade to protect the postwar liberal, rules-based order!88  Support trade to maintain the 
European project!  At times in the past, when concerns about war and peace dominated concerns about 
economics, these narratives have had significant appeal.  The problem with these narratives is that they make 
now-contested economics besides-the-point, at a time when contested economics seem more salient to many 
voters than these other concerns.  Politics in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the rest of Europe 
hardly suggest that these narratives are resonating beyond the foreign policy and intellectual elite. 
VI. EMBEDDED LIBERALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Few of the proposed alternative narratives for international trade have garnered the type of 
consensus enjoyed by that of growing the pie or raising all boats.  In recent history though, at least one other 
has: the narrative John Ruggie described as “embedded liberalism.”89  Ruggie built off the work of Karl 
                                                 
84 See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw, Why Economists Are Worried About International Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2018 
(“[E]xpanding trade hurts some people in the short run. That fact may call for a robust safety net and effective 
retraining. But it does not undermine the conclusion that free trade raises average living standards.”). 
85 See Making Trade an Engine of Growth for All, supra note 5, at 27-36 (“[G20 leaders] called for action to better 
communicate the benefits of open trade to a public that may have become more skeptical, especially in advanced 
economies.”). 
86 Vikram Singh, Dalibor Rohac, and Danielle Pletka, Partnership in Peril: The Populist Assault on the Transatlantic Community, 
CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, Posted on July 31, 2018, 7:00 am, 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2018/07/31/454248/partnership-in-peril/ (“Arguing over 
trade and tariffs will deepen those crises and accelerate momentum toward a decisive rift in transatlantic alliances.”); 
Simon Nixon, What’s At Stake as Rules-Based Trade Comes Under Fire, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2018. 
87 See, e.g., Giacomo Magistretti and Marco Tabellini, Economic Integration and Democracy: An Empirical Investigation, 
HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL WORKING PAPER, August 7, 2018, https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/economic-integration-
and-democracy-an-empirical-investigation (testing thesis); Mitchell Lerner, Trump's Unilateralism And Korea-US Alliance, 
KOREA TIMES, July 30, 2018, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinon/2018/07/198_253015.html (linking the 
issues). 
88 See, e.g., William A. Macdonald, Canada Must Act Fast On Trade And Competitiveness To Counter Trump, GLOBE AND MAIL, 
August 5, 2018. 
89 See John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 
36 INT’L ORG. 379 (1982). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3298389 
Cohen  IILJ Working Paper 2018/6 (MegaReg Series) 
 
17 
 
Polyani who famously explained how the market, long embedded within society, culture, and politics, had, 
over the course of the first great wave of globalization of the nineteenth century, become disembedded from 
them.90  The sudden ease with which capital and goods flowed around the world combined with the laissez-
faire logic of free markets overwhelmed existing social welfare mechanisms, leading to both massive 
dislocations of labor and near constant crises.91  With the onset of the global Great Depression, states felt 
they had to throw up barriers to trade in order to bring their individual economies and social welfare systems 
under control.92 The result was a contagious spread of beggar-thy-neighbor policies that deepened rather than 
alleviated the Depression and helped set the stage for World War II.93 
The new consensus that emerged from the period, exemplified in the thinking John Maynard Keynes, 
and reflected in the Bretton Woods international economic institutions of the postwar world, was that the re-
opening of global trade (and the growth necessary for rebuilding) would need to be reconciled with the state’s 
ability to develop its social welfare state.94  Re-embedding trade within society and politics meant limiting the 
scope of liberalization, both by allowing capital controls and lots of space for social welfare policies.95  It also 
put trade liberalization in a decidedly secondary policy position compared to domestic economic policies.  
Rather than judging domestic policies by whether they were impermissibly protectionist, trade policies were 
judged by whether they allowed for or forwarded domestic social welfare.96 
This consensus provided the normative foundation for the liberalized trading regime of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.  Embedded liberalism began to break down over the course of the 1970’s, 
as global recessions and stagflation convinced many policymakers (and voters) that the postwar 
accommodation of trade and social welfare policies was no longer workable. 97   Instead the neo-liberal 
                                                 
90 KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944). 
91 Id. 
92 See Eichengreen & Irwin, supra note 38. 
93 See id. 
94 See Ruggie, supra note 89, at 393 (“This was the essence of the embedded liberalism compromise: unlike the economic 
nationalism of the thirties, it would be multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism of the gold standard and free trade, 
its multilateralism would be predicated upon domestic interventionism.”). 
95 See id. at 396 (“[T]he principles of multilateralism and tariff reductions were affirmed, but so were safeguards, 
exemptions, exceptions, and restrictions-all designed to protect the balance of payments and a variety of domestic social 
policies.”). 
96 See id. at 397 (“The substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade was called for; but it was not made 
obligatory and it was coupled with appropriate emergency actions, which were allowed if a domestic producer was 
threatened with injury from import competition that was due to past tariff concessions.”); Robert Howse, From Politics to 
Technocracy—And Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 94 (2002) (“The postwar trade 
and financial order was therefore mainly designed to enable states to manage their domestic economies, in a manner 
consistent with political and social stability and justice, without the risk of setting off a protectionist race to the 
bottom.”); Andrew T.F. Lang, Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie and Constructivist Approaches to the Study 
of the International Trade Regime, in EMBEDDING GLOBAL MARKETS: AN ENDURING CHALLENGE 18-19 (John Gerard 
Ruggie, ed. 2008) (“[T]he liberalism of Free Trade was embedded within a deeper commitment to an interventionist 
programme of governmental social action.”). 
97 See Howse, supra note 96, at 101 (“The collapse of the gold standard and with it the structure for managed 
macroeconomic adjustment foreseen by the Bretton Woods system, combined with the recession of the 1970s and the 
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consensus that still dominates began to take hold, and with it the view that global growth through 
liberalization should be the primary goal of international economic policy.98 
Embedded liberalism was a fraternal twin of the human rights embodied in the Four Freedoms,99 the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 100  and the two International Covenants. 101   The worldwide 
Depression and World War II had encouraged a rethinking of the role of government in economic 
policymaking.  Laissez-faire views had fallen out of favor, replaced by beliefs that governments had an 
obligation to protect the welfare of their citizens.102  While embedded liberalism sought to create space for 
those government policies, the human rights movement sought to require it, proclaiming the rights of 
individuals to employment, social welfare, and health, among others. 103   The core of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) is the obligation on “Each State… individually 
and through international assistance and co-operation,”104 to provide for the welfare of its people.  The 
ICESCR Committee, together with human rights advocates and scholars, have spent the past few decades 
developing the meaning and substance of those obligations.105  Many, more recently, have drawn on the work 
of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum to develop an approach focused on the states’ obligations to help 
individual realize their “capabilities” – to enable their citizens to live lives they value.106 
                                                                                                                                                             
mounting intellectual and practical (stagflation) challenges to the Keynsian consensus, led to increasing emphasis on 
microeconomic interventions of various sorts for adjustment purposes, as well as to new kinds of trade restrictions.”). 
98 See id. at 104 (“they moved from free trade as an economic ideology to free trade as embedded in a broader liberal 
economic ideology. Trade liberalization became part of a general set of prescriptions for growth and prosperity, at odds 
to a large extent with the progressive welfare state vision of the embedded liberalism bargain.”). 
99 See FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS (Jan. 6, 1941), https://fdrlibrary.org/four-freedoms) 
(arguing that the United States should provide wartime aid to Great Britain the protect the four freedoms that all people 
possess—the freedom of speech, the freedom of worship, the freedom from want, and the freedom from fear). 
100 UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Dec. 10, 1948), 
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/. 
101 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON 
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (Dec. 16, 1966), https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx; 
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (Dec. 16, 1966), 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
102 See supra notes 95-96 & accompanying text. 
103 Though, ironically, the United States, author of the “Four Freedoms,” favored a more liberal international trade 
regime, part of the reason for its failure to ratify the International Trade Organization. 
104 ICESCR, supra note 101, art. 2.1. 
105 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, AN EVALUATION OF THE 
OBLIGATION TO TAKE STEPS TO THE “MAXIMUM OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES” UNDER AN OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO 
THE COVENANT (May 10, 2007), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/escr/docs/e_c12_2007_1.pdf ; David Marcus, 
The Normative Development of Socioeconomic Rights Through Supranational Adjudication, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 53 (2006); Michael J. 
Dennis & David P. Steward, Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There be an International Complaints 
Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health? 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 462 (2004). 
106 See, e.g., MARTHA NUSSBAUM & AMARTYA SEN, THE QUALITY OF LIFE (1993). 
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But although born together, international human rights law and the Bretton Woods institutions, 
embedded in their own parallel institutions, quickly diverged. 107   While the international economic law 
machinery was picking up steam, the economic rights embodied in the Universal Declaration and ICESCR 
became politicized in East-West and North-South fights and struggled to gain traction.108  Advocates for 
economic and social rights did eventually have some success in promoting states’ obligations to provide basic 
minimum rights.  By that point though, their strategies of focusing on state level policies and judicial 
enforcement of constitutional economic rights stood in stark contrast to the inter-state globalism by-then-
embraced by international trade.  The two models seemed to have become completely inapposite.109  To the 
extent to which one was paying attention to developments in both areas of international law, the divergence 
may actually have reinforced the two-step consensus that free trade would define inter-state policy and 
human rights would define domestic.  
Moreover, attempts during this period to bridge this gap and to bring the human rights vision to bear 
on international economic law were largely driven by developing states.  Associated with efforts to develop a 
New International Economic Order or a trade and development agenda,110 such calls put the developed states 
which had built the Bretton Woods institutions and their successors on the defensive.  
Now may be the time though to seek reconciliation between these estranged siblings.  For one thing, 
neither calls for a renewed focus on social welfare and the state’s obligations to its people nor a skepticism 
about the benefits of unfettered liberalization are now limited to the developing world.  In fact, it is 
traditionally developing states like China and India who seem to have the most current enthusiasm for global 
international economic institutions111 (even as they bend the rules in their own favor).  This geo-political 
reality reflects the apparent lesson of the now famous “elephant graph” of Branko Milanovic.112  Plotting the 
global change in real income from 1998-2008 by income percentile, the graph shows how much of the world 
– the 10th-65th income percentiles along with the very top earners – have experienced massive growth in real 
income over that period.  One group, though, has not – the 75th-85th income percentiles.  While the first 
                                                 
107 See Christiana Ochoa, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 57, 58-59 (2003) (Although they share philosophical roots in liberal 
ideals, human rights and international economic law stand as polarized communities, as a result of a decades-long 
creation of separate instruments and institutions.”). 
108 Samuel Moyn also suggests that framing social welfare obligations in terms of rights was more anachronistic at the 
time of the Universal Declaration than is generally understood.  See MOYN, supra note 71, at 41-67. 
109 See LANG, supra note 72, at 52 (“Still, the legacy of mutual professional isolation remained.”). 
110 See id., at 48-52; Harold Hongju Koh, The New New International Economic Order, 87 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 459, 459-
60 (1993) (“[D]eveloping nations posited a new set of principles based on more explicitly distributive and equitable 
considerations. They spoke of “economic self determination,” “sovereignty over natural resources,” hostility toward 
“dependencia” (over-dependence on multinational enterprises), freedom to modify contracts to deal with changing 
circumstances, and “appropriate compensation under all the circumstances.” 
111 See, e.g., Rachel Brewster, Monkey Cage: Trump Is Breaking The WTO. Will China Want To Save It?, WASH. POST, May 2, 
2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/05/02/trump-is-breaking-the-wto-will-china-
want-to-save-it/?utm_term=.04c861af032b.  
112 Branko Milanovic, The Greatest Reshuffle of Individual Incomes Since the Industrial Revolution, VOX (July 1 2016), 
http://voxeu.org/article/greatest-reshuffle-individual-incomes-industrial-revolution. 
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group is disproportionately located in the new economic powerhouses of Asia, the second is 
disproportionately represented by the middle class of the older developed states.113  It may be time for the 
developed world to rediscover the normative vision of international human rights law and make it its own.114 
For another, as populist politics gain new force among developed state electorates, the human rights 
vision may become an attractive way to ground international economic policy within domestic social welfare 
needs.  Tying international trade law to states’ human rights obligations to provide for the welfare of their 
people may be a narrative through which international economic policy can become “re-embedded.”   
To be clear, the idea is not to wholesale import human rights jurisprudence into international 
economic law (though that might be an option).  Attempts to translate between the two fields carry a lot of 
baggage, and while a renewed interest in international economic rights may be a source of ideas and 
inspiration for international economic law, the best plan may be to develop parallel, complementary 
discourses between human rights and international economic law, rather than a single one. 115   A new 
narrative for international trade and economic law should sound in the language and logic of international 
economic law.  Focusing on states’ welfare obligations may, for example, recast or re-emphasize economic 
aspects of the neoliberal narrative that are currently treated as secondary.  One part of the neoliberal 
narrative, for example, has been that free trade helps protect domestic consumers against would-be domestic 
monopolists, subjecting the latter to foreign competition and diluting their ability to capture domestic 
regulatory decisions.116  Seen through the lens of the states’ obligations to its people, this narrative takes on 
different weight and priority, moving it ahead of wealth maximization goals.  It also suggests different trade 
policy priorities, promoting liberalized trade that encourages competition and that benefits both consumers 
and labor rather than (and perhaps at the expense of) big corporatist interests.   
The key is to develop a shared normative narrative for international trade and economic law that can 
justify and guide international trade agreements going forward, while responding the concerns that have led 
some to abandon the current one.  Most importantly, a new shared narrative needs to encourage a more 
                                                 
113 Id.  There have been attempts to revisit and refine the data on which Milanovic relies, producing somewhat different, 
perhaps less dramatic, curves. Those other curves though don't undercut the basic point here though about the shifting 
benefits of, and relative enthusiasm for, globalization.  See, e.g., Homi Kharas and Brina Seidel, What’s Happening to the 
World Income Distribution? The Elephant Chart Revisited, GLOBAL ECONOMY & DEVELOPMENT WORKING PAPER 114 (April 
2018), available at https://www.brookings.edu/research/whats-happening-to-the-world-income-distribution-the-
elephant-chart-revisited/. 
114 Interestingly, or perhaps anachronistically, this view has been recently voiced by former Treasury Secretary Lawrence 
Summers: “A new approach has to begin from the idea that the basic responsibility of government is to maximize the 
welfare of citizens, not to pursue some abstract concept of the global good.”  See Lawrence Summers, How to Embrace 
Nationalism Responsibly, WASH. POST (July 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/how-
to-embrace-nationalism-responsibly/2016/07/10/faf7a100-4507-11e6-8856-
f26de2537a9d_story.html?utm_term=.b27b0f3dc1ea. 
115 As Samuel Moyn has recounted, the rights-based account was only one of a wide range of ways of states’ welfare 
obligations over time.  See generally MOYN, supra note 71. 
116 See Nicolas Lamp, Value And Exchange In Multilateral Trade Lawmaking, 4 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 7, 13-17 (2016).  As 
Lamp explains, this narrative was actually dominant in the United States in the middle part of the twentieth century, but 
was associated then with ideas of “competitive tariffs” rather than free trade.  See id. 
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inclusive politics, one that engages a broader range of policy topics and a broader swathe of the public.  A Re-
embedded liberalism, built on states’ obligations to their people might be just such a narrative.  
There is though, it should be noted, a significant cost in refocusing international trade law on states’ 
domestic obligations.  What arguably gets lost in this narrative is any concept of and concern for global 
justice.117  Focusing on states’ obligations to their citizens risks brushing aside the obligations each state has 
towards others.  The ICESCR itself reflects this trade-off.  Although the treaty does include some obligations 
of international assistance, they remain decidedly secondary and vague.118  The struggle to reconcile domestic 
and international obligations in theories of justice is well-known, finding echoes, for example, in John Rawls’ 
liberal account of diminishing obligations to state outsiders.119  
From the standpoint of developing states and their advocates, witnesses to the continuing inequality 
in wealth distribution around the world,120 this normative narrative likely looks like no more than a reification 
of the status quo in favor of whiny developed states.  It was just such views that drove third-world attempts 
to build a New International Economic Order.  More importantly, an effective, shared normative narrative 
for international trade should have the potential to resonate widely—not just among a few developed states.   
But a focus on states’ obligations to provide for its people also raises serious questions about how 
much harm the domestic policies of one state can cause to others and what sorts of policy externalities should 
be internalized by each state.  Notions of efficiency, transparency, and even-handedness that undergird and 
guide trade regulation today do not need to be thrown out.  Even as they are pushed aside as primary 
determinants of state policy, they may remain standards for judging good or bad trade arrangements.  As in 
the era of embedded liberalism, they can serve as secondary principles that help judge the various alternative 
policies that might be used to achieve the welfarist goals of the state.  And they can and should continue to be 
the focus of the WTO and other international agreements.  Guaranteeing that states don't callously or 
unnecessarily harm each other through their policies has long been one of objects of international trade law, 
embodied in its rules.  Under this new narrative, they become the primary object.  Rather than means of 
achieving maximally efficient trade, the rules of the WTO and other international agreements remain as 
backstops, sources of discipline, protecting each state’s ability to make decisions in its people’s interests from 
the encroaching actions of others.    
And at the very least, a narrative focused on states’ obligations to provide for its people does put all 
states’ domestic policy concerns on equal ground.  Under the neoliberal model, principles of economic 
efficiency reign supreme, and developing states are precluded from adopting certain types of industrial 
                                                 
117 See generally OISIN SUTTLE, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND WORLD TRADE LAW (2018). 
118 See, e,g., MOYN, supra note 71, at 110-12. 
119 JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999). 
120 See, e.g., Jason Hickel, Global Inequality May Be Much Worse Than We Think, GUARDIAN, April 8, 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2016/apr/08/global-inequality-may-be-
much-worse-than-we-think. 
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policies, even if they deem them in their citizens’ best interests.  Focusing on states’ obligations to provide for 
its people, however, provides as much justification for China’s interests in raising its people’s welfares as the 
United States’ or United Kingdom’s and as will be discussed, creates a logic for trades in policy flexibility—as 
matters of principle rather than exceptions for politics.121  
VII. RE-EMBEDDING LIBERALISM FOR AN ERA OF GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS 
Revising embedded liberalism and adopting a normative narrative based on states’ obligations to 
provide for their people’s welfare does not dictate a particular theory of local or global economic justice.  
Instead, it shifts the terms of and locations where debates between those theories will take place.  
International trade law, currently untethered from debates about domestic economic policy and 
redistribution, becomes subject to (and a subject of) them.  By emphasizing trade’s embeddedness within a 
broader welfare-enhancing project, it should help shift the locus of decisionmaking about international 
economic policy from the interstate negotiating table to the domestic one.  It provides a justification for 
embedding discussions about trade within discussions about domestic economic policy, eliminating the two-
step approach in favor of a single step.   
The point is not to reject liberalizing trade or to embrace protectionism, but to embed discussions 
about the pace, scope, and terms of liberalized trade within discussions about domestic economics.  
Imagining trade liberalization as part of a larger economic welfare policy shifts trade out of the driver’s seat of 
either domestic economic policy or of international cooperation.122  Liberalized trade does bring a variety of 
economic and non-economic welfare benefits, including growing the overall pie, but the question becomes 
how those tools serve the broader social welfare goal, rather than how those goals might temper the hard-
driving logic of trade.123  The pace and shape of liberalization are dictated by domestic welfare goals, not the 
other way around.   
And this shift in policy polarity from the international to the domestic applies seems all the more 
important as new, complicated policy issues like climate change mitigation and adaptation, regulation of the 
data economy, and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) emerge.  Under the prevailing neo-liberal model, 
negotiations to liberalize trade in these areas run apace, led by the interests of domestic industries.  The hard 
policy questions about trade-offs between climate change mitigation and trade liberalization, 124  over 
ownership of data, privacy, and consumer protection in the digital economy, and over the future-of-work in 
                                                 
121 See Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape Clause” with Normative 
Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 273 (1991).  
122 Cf. Shaffer, supra note 6, at 6 (“[T]rade officials often lose sight of these goals by narrowing the operational goal of 
trade agreements to that of trade liberalization.”). 
123 See id. (“the organizing principle of trade agreements should be to enhance social and individual capacity in support of 
human flourishing. From that principle, trade agreements should not be assessed solely in terms of their impact on 
aggregate national and global GDP (the gains from trade), but also in terms of their distributional effects and their 
implications for social inclusion and social stability.”). 
124 Timothy Meyer, How Local Discrimination Can Promote Global Public Goods, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1937 (2015). 
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an AI-driven economy are left in their wake, forced to operate against the rules and economic realities 
produced by international agreements.  While these issues need not be resolved before negotiations over trade 
can take place, they should at the very least be part of the same conversation.   
But it is not just the policy issues that have changed or may be changing.  The structure of the entire 
economy has changed since the Bretton Woods institutions were first imagined.  Modern transport and 
rapidly developing technologies has changed the relationship between trade and national economies.  Re-
embedding liberalism requires imagining how a narrative built on national welfare would reshape policy in an 
era of complex global value chains. 
The economic world looks very different from the one in which embedded liberalism took hold.  
Technology and cheap, rapid transit of raw materials, components, goods, and information have made 
complex global value chains possible.125  The process of production can be unbundled and located in a variety 
of different countries, as corporations look for the most efficient producers of each part of the process.  
While this can lead to better, cheaper products as producers chase comparative advantage in every direction, 
it also makes capital incredibly mobile, allowing capitalists to scour the world for opportunities that maximize 
profits and minimize inputs, allowing capital to increase its gains at the expense of labor.  It also disembeds 
capital completely from the state:  Not only can capital wriggle free from taxes and regulations by strategically 
locating production and finances, but it can use its mobility to force states to compete for its presence, 
starting a regulatory and tax race-to-the bottom.  At the same time that economists are increasingly worrying 
that the gains to capital are significantly outpacing the gains to labor126 states are losing the tools they need to 
rebalance the relationship.  
These realities suggest that the most pressing needs of a state looking to provide for the welfare of its 
own people may not be trade agreements, but agreements to coordinate and collect taxes and to stanch 
regulatory leakage.  In a normative narrative focused on states’ domestic obligations, the role of international 
negotiations shift.  As states seek to promote the capabilities of their inhabitants,127 negotiations become ways 
for states to cooperate in achieving those goals.  Trade negotiations might be replaced by negotiations over 
“cooperative capability promotion.”  Lowering trade barriers to produce greater wealth for each state would 
undoubtedly remain an aim, but it may now come second to other issues like: (1) tax coordination and 
collection, (2) regulatory convergence, and (3) trades in policy flexibility. 
                                                 
125 David Dollar, Global Value Chains Shed New Light on Trade, BROOKINGS INST. (July 10, 2017), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/07/10/global-value-chains-shed-new-light-on-trade/. 
126 See, e.g., MICHAEL JACOBS & MARIANA MAZZUCATO, RETHINKING CAPITALISM 8-10 (2016); THOMAS PIKETTY, 
CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014). 
127 See supra note 106, and accompanying text (discussing Nussbaum and Sen). 
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1. Tax Coordination and Collection 
Before a state can redistribute the gains of trade, it must capture the gains of trade.  Global 
supply/value chains and the extreme mobility of capital have made that extraordinarily difficult. 128  The 
example of Apple—a company that can invest its profits anywhere along its global supply chain or park them 
in the country offering the lowest taxes, all while it waits for a tax holiday in the United States—has become 
almost a cliché.129  It nonetheless well-captures the problem for many developed states today.   
The recent corporate tax cuts in the United States demonstrate the pathologies of the current 
situation.130  Given the extreme mobility of capital that comes with complex value chains, multinational 
corporations can force states to bid for their presence.  States who want to capture any of the value of the 
corporation’s economic activity, whether through taxes or jobs (or taxes on jobs) are forced to promise lower 
and lower corporate taxes.131  As they do so, those same states have no choice but to make up that revenue 
by taxing less mobile wealth – income taxes, property taxes, and sales taxes.132  Together these two forces 
squeeze the same workers who have grown skeptical of trade’s benefits.  The AFL-CIO, for example, has 
highlighted how the loss of state revenues due to trade deals and tax competition has starved states of the 
funds necessary for national economic projects like investments in infrastructure.133   
What then can be done at the international level?  A starting point for an international economic 
policy built around a state’s obligation to provide for the welfare of its people might be transnational tax 
coordination.  States would want to negotiate both an end to tax competition and a fair division of tax 
receipts along the value chain.  It would seek to use international cooperation to diminish the distortive 
                                                 
128 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crises of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 
1575-76 (2000) (The mobility of capital has resulted in international tax competition, in which sovereign countries aim to 
attract both portfolio and direct investment by lowering their tax rates on income earned by foreigners. Tax competition, 
in turn, threatens to undermine the individual and corporate income taxes, which traditionally have generated the largest 
share of revenue for modern welfare states.”). 
129 See John Gapper, Apple, Keep Your Cool over Global Tax, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2016) 
https://www.ft.com/content/de2cbd7c-6f5e-11e6-a0c9-1365ce54b926 (describing how Apple diverting its overseas 
revenues to the low corporate tax jurisdiction of Ireland); see also Rob Davies, US Corporations Have $1.4 Trillion in Tax 
Havens, Claims Oxfam Report, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/14/us-
corporations-14-trillion-hidden-tax-havens-oxfam (citing a report that Apple holds $181 billion offshore in three 
subsidiaries) 
130 See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. Law No. 115-97, § 13001 (Dec. 22, 2017) (lowering the corporate tax rate to 21% ); 
William G. Gale et al., Effects of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: A Preliminary Analysis, TAX POLICY CTR. 5-6 (June 13, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ES_20180608_tcja_summary_paper_final.pdf (discussing 
the “sweeping changes” the law made to the “treatment of foreign source income and international financial flows”). 
131 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 83, at 1575. 
132 See id. at 1624 (“[A]s an economy becomes more open to capital flows, it tends increasingly to shift the tax burden 
from capital to labor.”); Allison Christians, How Nations Share, 87 INDIANA L. J. 1407, 1408 (2012). (“Governments that 
fare poorly will be forced to look ever more intensely to income that is “trapped” by national physical and institutional 
boundaries-namely, the kind of income that arises from working and buying goods in domestically controlled and 
monitored markets, rather than the kind that is earned as it passes through multiple jurisdictions with widely varying 
levels of regulatory oversight.”). 
133 AFL-CIO, Making NAFTA Work for Working People 22-25 (2017), available at https://aflcio.org/statements/written-
comments-how-make-nafta-work-working-people. 
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influence of big corporatist interests in tax policy.134  Negotiations along these lines have occurred through 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which has sought coordinated 
action through a list of measures states can take together and individually to prevent “base erosion and profit 
shifting” (BEPS) by multinational corporations.135 Even as states adopt measures along those lines, however, 
corporations and wealthy individuals continue to find loopholes in the system136 that end up shielding their 
income from taxation.137  
A commitment to re-embedding trade in a state welfare narrative though might mean moving these 
goals from the periphery of international economic agreements to the center.  Trade liberalization and 
regulatory convergence might become carrots held out to both states and corporations in order to achieve 
more effective tax coordination.  Lowered tariff and regulatory barriers might be offered to other states in 
return for tax coordination.138  Policies desired by multinational corporations like free data mobility might be 
offered as part of a negotiating mandate in order to secure their support. 
While tax coordination would be a first step, more ambitious tax negotiation policies might be 
imagined.139  Specific new taxes, like a tax on financial transaction suggested by Tim Meyer and Frank Garcia 
might be negotiated.140  Tax revenue from the value chain might be partially invested in a development bank 
that would support jobs-producing projects in member countries.  Most radical of all, states could require 
corporations to pay a fee for access to certain free trade benefits, as suggested by Thomas Streinz.141 
It might seem naïve or anachronistic to suggest that states might better coordinate to tax global value 
chain so soon after the passage of large corporate tax cuts in the United States.  Proponents of lower 
corporate taxes, including corporate interests themselves, seem to be in political ascendancy. But it is for 
precisely that reason that a new normative vision of trade and economic law is needed.  Only a new vision 
can reorder current politics, creating the space to make arguments linking higher corporate taxes and 
liberalized trade and granting successful politicians some measure of leverage with corporations.  In turn, that 
                                                 
134 See supra text accompanying note 116. 
135 OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013). 
136 …partly, by shifting income from corporations to individuals.  
137 See Shaffer, supra note 6, at 20-21. 
138 One concern with reformulating the deals this way is that they risk running afoul of the Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
obligations under the WTO agreements.  One reason why current economic megadeals are styled Free-Trade 
Agreements, even while covering many other topics, is that only where barriers are  “eliminated with respect to 
substantially all the trade,” GATT Art. XXIV.8, are they exempted from the requirement to offer agreed-upon benefits 
to all WTO members.  For these purposes, that might mean that only free trade deals, rather than specific concessions 
can be held out as carrots for tax coordination or as described infra, regulatory convergence or flexibility.  There may be 
ways to structure the agreement to fit within a different exception to the agreement, though under current Appellate 
Body jurisprudence, that might be difficult.  It may instead be that these priorities suggest aspects of the WTO 
agreements that need to be revised in order to recognize a revised normative narratice for international trade.  
139 Cf. Carol C. Gould, Approaching Global Justice Through Human Rights, in GLOBAL JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW 41 (CARMODY, GARCIA, & LINARELLI, EDS. 2012).  
140 See Frank J. Garcia & Timothy Meyer, Restoring Trade’s Social Contract, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE. 78, 93-100 (2018). 
141 Thomas Streinz, Re-Embedding Liberalism: Introducing “Passporting Fees” for Free Trade (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author). 
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may make those politicians more credible dealmakers, able to offer corporations trade policies they want in 
return for a higher tax burden.  Corporate acquiescence to tax coordination could be a condition of greater 
regulatory convergence or digital liberalization.    
A focus on tax policy has the advantage too of dovetailing with other current concerns, including the 
concern that gains to capital are outpacing gains to labor and that automation may be a bigger structural 
threat to labor that trade. As AI continues to take jobs once reliably performed by human workers – on help-
desks, in sales, as drivers – the pressure on states to provide a safety net, whether in the form of a guaranteed 
basic income or something else will only grow.  At the very least, the policy flexibility demanded by these 
coming changes requires a fiscally flexible state. 
2. Regulatory Convergence 
An international economic policy built around protecting the welfare of a state’s people would have 
to defend domestic environmental and worker protections from outside threats.  Supporters of progressive 
labor and environmental policies have long worried that liberalized trade can undermine their goals. 142  
Higher minimum wages, protections for workers, and environmental protection raise the costs of doing 
business in a state, putting that state’s workers at a comparative disadvantage compared to workers in less 
regulated states.143  At the same time, liberalized trade with less regulated states risks regulatory leakage, 
diluting policy successes by simply moving undesirable behaviors elsewhere.  The rise of complex supply 
chains only exacerbates the problem, making movement of tasks to cheaper production locales extraordinarily 
easy. 
These concerns have led to labor and environmental side agreements to NAFTA144 and labor and 
environmental chapters in later free trade agreements.145  The TPP took this logic the farthest so far.  Not 
only did the agreement require states to abide by certain specific minimum internationally agreed labor 
standards, 146  but the United States required Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia to sign more stringent side 
agreements.147  The side agreement with Vietnam, for example, required specific legislative changes aimed at 
                                                 
142 See Davies & Vadlamannati, supra note 52 (finding a decline in labor standards attributable to trade liberalization); 
Robert F. Housman & Paul M. Orbuch, Integrating Labor and Environmental Concerns into the North American Free Trade 
Agreement: A Look Back and a Look Ahead, 8 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 719 (1993). 
143 See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitivness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2041 (1993) (arguing 
that “a nation's imposition of stringent environmental regulation and liability rules may harm its international 
competitiveness”). 
144 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, opened for signature Sept. 8, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480; 
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499. 
145 See Meyer, Saving the Political Consensus, supra note 6, at 1002-08 (discussing examples). 
146 See Trans-Pacific Partnership, art. 19.3 (“Each Party shall adopt and maintain in its statutes and regulations, and 
practices thereunder, the following rights as stated in the ILO Declaration. . . .”). 
147 See Brunei Darussalam – United States Labour Consistency Plan, Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text; Malaysia – United States Labour Consistency 
Plan, Feb. 4, 2016;, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text 
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guaranteeing an effective right to organize unions.148   Both the labor standard commitments in TPP and the 
side agreements would have been subject to the TPP’s dispute settlement mechanism.149  
Focusing on the state’s obligation to its people and negotiating cooperative capacity promotion 
would suggest continuing down this path, tying minimum labor and environmental standards to regulatory 
convergence along the supply chain.  Trade liberalization and regulatory convergence should be held out not 
as the goal, but as carrots offered in return for transnational labor and environmental protection.  In other 
words, labor and environmental agreements should offer up trade incentives, not the other way around.  
From a structural standpoint, this might mean turning the negotiating lead and the pen over to human rights, 
labor, or environmental specialists, rather than trade negotiators.   
Beyond the protections themselves, a refocused economic policy would grant labor more of a role in 
enforcing the agreements.150 One way to do so might be by shifting labor and environmental compliance into 
trade remedies.  While states must normally use the WTO’s dispute settlement system to raise complaints 
about other members’ actions, 151  the WTO agreements create an exception for complaints regarding 
improper subsidies, the dumping of imports below normal price, or the sudden, massive influx competing 
products into the domestic market.  In those cases, states are allowed to respond with tariffs or other trade 
barriers after following domestic processes meeting the standards laid out in the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, 152  Anti-Dumping Agreement, 153  and the Agreement on Safeguards. 154   Those 
responses are then subject to complaint and review under the WTO’s dispute settlement system.  Subjecting 
unfair competition based on violations of labor and/or environmental rules to this sort of process, by giving 
states initial control over sanctions, would increase the credibility of enforcement threats.  Even more 
significantly, it might open up the possibility of allowing labor and environmental groups to initiate domestic 
enforcement hearings, thereby giving them a voice in ongoing trade policy and the enforcement of trade 
deals.  Gregory Shaffer, for example, has developed a mechanism states might use to assess social dumping 
                                                                                                                                                             
United States – Viet Nam Plan for the Enhancement of Trade and Labour Relations, Feb. 4, 2016, 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text. 
148 “United States-Viet Nam Plan for the Enhancement of Trade and Labour Relations,” available at: 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Labour-US-VN-Plan-for-Enhancement-of-Trade-and-Labor-
Relations.pdf.  See Lamp, supra note 73, at 29-30, for a fuller description of the agreement. 
149 See Trans-Pacific Partnership, art. 19.15.12. 
150 See Claussen, supra note 25 (detailing how these agreements currently work and the role granted to labor and other 
private parties). 
151 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 23, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401. 
152 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, arts. 11-23, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14. 
153 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201. 
154 Agreement on Safeguards, arts. 2-8, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154. 
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duties that combines elements of existing anti-dumping and safeguards procedures.155  His carefully designed 
mechanism would protect workers from competition violating internationally recognized labor rights without 
becoming a mere mask for protectionism.156 
Labor and environmental advocates might also be given access to regulatory decisions in states 
parties.  TPP included a regulatory chapter that encouraged convergence by specifying regulatory tools like 
cost-benefit analysis, 157  encouraging regulatory coordination between states parties, 158  and guaranteeing 
corporations access to state regulatory processes.159  New agreements could offer stronger guarantees of 
access for all stakeholders.   
The offer of regulatory convergence might be made to multinational corporations as well.  
Multinational corporations want regulatory convergence; it allows them to move tasks along their supply 
chains more easily and efficiently.160  States could offer multinational corporations streamlined regulatory 
access, perhaps through safe harbors, in return for guarantees with regard to labor and environmental 
standards along the supply chain.  Such guarantees would risk WTO challenge, but might be constructed to 
fit within various exceptions.  At the very least, pushing for such a reading would seem a priority of a state 
obligation focused economic policy. 
3. Trading Flexibility 
Dani Rodrik has suggested shifting from trading barrier reductions to trading policy space.161  An 
assumption built into the current grow-the-pie narrative is that liberalization is unidirectional.  Liberalizing 
trade produces welfare gains for all states; protectionism leaves everyone with less.  Accordingly, states should 
always be seeking further liberalization. 
The consensus obscures many of the questions that remain about liberalizing trade.  While few 
disagree with the abstract logic of comparative advantage, questions can be raised about the pace and 
trajectory of liberalization.  States don’t enter trade negotiations at the same point in their economic 
development.  Specific forms of liberalization, undertaken at particular times, will affect states differently, 
fixing certain advantages and disadvantages in places.  As Dani Rodrik notes, for example, eliminating export 
                                                 
155 Shaffer, supra note 6, at 34-43. 
156 Id. 
157 Trans-Pacific Partnership, art. 25.5.2 (b). 
158 See id., art. 25.4.1 (“[E]ach Party shall endeavour to ensure that it has processes or mechanisms to facilitate the 
effective interagency coordination and review of proposed covered regulatory measures.”). 
159 See id., art. 25.8 (“The Committee shall establish appropriate mechanisms to provide continuing opportunities for 
interested persons of the Parties to provide input on matters relevant to enhancing regulatory coherence.”). 
160 See Hoekman & Nelson, supra note 9, at 9-10. 
161 See RODRIK, supra note 43.  
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subsidies may freeze developing states’ advantages where they are, granting access to their raw materials, but 
making the development of higher-tech, value-added industries unlikely.162 
Moreover, the lesson of disembedded and embedded liberalism is that untamed liberalization can 
make other economic policy goals more difficult, undermining the state’s ability to make effective policies.163  
Even if liberalization is a generally desirable goal, flexibility may be necessary to marry overall growth with 
specific socio-economic policies. 
Perhaps states should be negotiating divergences from the liberalization norm rather than further 
liberalization.  Developing states might negotiate for space to enact export subsidies (now banned under the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures164) to help build up domestic industries; developed 
states might demand in return the ability enact labor or environmental safeguards.  Such negotiated 
divergences would have to be limited lest they unravel the rules of international trade entirely.  Gregory 
Shaffer has done the most advanced work translating Rodrik’s suggestion into legal rules compatible with the 
WTO’s obligations and goals, suggesting substantive and procedural limits that could be applied both to the 
subsidies and safeguards available in such deals, and which could be reviewed through WTO (or alternative) 
procedures.  A different or further limitation might be to limit the number or value of flexibilities that could 
be bargained for or the length of time for using them.  States could be forced to choose one (or some other 
number) strategic program to subsidize or industry to protect.  The goal would be to force states to justify the 
need for flexibility, not only to their negotiating partner, but their domestic populaces as well.  Flexibilities 
might be time-limited as well.  Subsidies or safeguards might have time-limits attached and/or the agreements 
allowing them might be sun-setted altogether.165  Both would help to guarantee that such trades reflect each 
state’s current policy needs and help limit their use as vehicles to entrench benefits for particular interests. 
One complaint about safeguards is that they tend to hurt a state’s consumers more than they help 
specific industries.  Many pointed out, for example, that the recently approved safeguards on solar panels in 
the United States, by raising the price of solar panels beyond what many homeowners can afford would cost 
far more American panel installer jobs than the panel manufacturing jobs it might save.166  But in a certain 
sense, that may be exactly the point.  Safeguards have rarely been used, at least in part, because they pit one 
group within a state against another, with uncertain consequences for both.  One of the core concerns with 
the current normative narrative is that it establishes a stale politics, which excludes many voices from active 
                                                 
162 To be fair, the poorest developing countries do retain considerable flexibility in this regard under the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
163 See RODRIK, supra note 43. 
164 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art 3.1 (a) 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm_01_e.htm (prohibiting “subsidies contingent, in law or in fact(4), 
whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon export performance. . .”). 
165 See Meyer, Misaligned Lawmaking, supra note 27, at *40-41. 
166 See, e.g., Nichola Groom, Billions In U.S. Solar Projects Shelved After Trump Panel Tariff, REUTERS, June 7, 2018, 1:08 AM, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trump-effect-solar-insight/billions-in-u-s-solar-projects-shelved-after-trump-panel-
tariff-idUSKCN1J30CT. 
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involvement in trade policies.  The option of labor or environmental safeguards might provide a means to a 
more open, more robust trade politics, both at the negotiation and applications stages. 
A different form of flexibility might be negotiated into interpretations of current trade agreements’ 
policy exceptions.  Current doctrine leaves little room for domestic political realities.167  Politics rarely allow 
policies to be adopted in pristine, idealized forms.  Instead, the need to build coalitions and assemble votes 
often requires policies to be watered down or exceptions granted for particular interests/interest groups.  For 
the policies’ proponents, the hope is that even with exceptions, meaningful progress on policy goals can be 
made.  Under current WTO doctrine, however, those exceptions undercut arguments for the policies’ 
necessity, suggest that a policy’s application is unacceptably arbitrary or unjustifiably discriminatory, or that 
the enacted measure is not the least trade restrictive means of achieving the policy goals.168 Political feasibility 
is not an acceptable justification.  A trade policy built upon a state’s obligation to provide for its people’s 
welfare would need to protect genuine domestic political settlements. 169   At the international level, 
administering a political policy exception would be very difficult, but it might reflect the sort of flexibility a re-
centered economic policy might demand.  One possibility would be to adopt a more deferential stance to 
legislative bargains that aim towards acceptable policy goals.  Deference could be contingent on compliance 
with various procedural rules including time-lines, transparency, and due process.  Another option might be 
to require only proof that a less-than-ideal policy would be marginally more effective in achieving those goals.   
VIII. SHIFTING NARRATIVES 
The normative consensus around the “grow the pie,” “raise all boats” narrative is fraying, and with it 
norms about acceptable and unacceptable trade policies.  The United States has raised tariffs on a variety of 
goods from a variety of trading partners in an effort to protect certain industries and gain leverage to 
negotiate “better” deals.170  To justify these moves, the United States has questionably invoked the GATT’s 
national security exception,171 violating a longstanding taboo that may encourage aggressive trade actions by 
                                                 
167 Cf. Timothy Meyer, How Local Discrimination Can Promote Global Public Goods, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1937 (2015). 
168 See, e.g., Shrimp-Turtle (rejecting different phase-in periods as unjustifiably discriminatory); Appellate Body Report, 
European Communities--Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/AB/R, 
WT/DS401/AB/R (Adopted June 18, 2014) (seeing exceptions as undercutting argument for seal fur ban); Panel 
Report, United States--Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/R (Sept. 2, 2011) 
(rejecting market realities as justification for clove cigarette exclusion). 
169 In this sense, the current two-step consensus undercuts itself.  Redistribution is left to domestic policymaking, in part, 
to allow democratic decisionmaking to take place.   That policymaking though isn’t judged on its own terms, but instead 
subjected to international standards.   
170 See, e.g., Kellie Ell, Former Office Depot CEO: Using tariffs to bolster trade leverage is working for Trump, CNBC, May 31, 2018, 
3:38 PM ET, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/31/trump-uses-tariffs-to-bolster-trade-leverage--and-its-working-
ceo.html. 
171 See, e.g., Krzysztof J. Pelc, Monkey Cage: The U.S. broke a huge global trade taboo. Here’s why Trump’s move might be legal, 
WASHINGTON POST, June 7, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/06/07/the-u-s-broke-a-
huge-global-trade-taboo-heres-why-trumps-move-might-be-legal/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.cd95c5062647. 
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others.172  In the trade skirmishes that have resulted, its partners have responded either with questionably 
legal Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs)173 or questionably legal retaliatory tariffs of their own.174  These 
partners have also used the mechanisms available through the WTO to challenge U.S. actions.  Those 
challenges fall under the shadow though of the United States’ continued assault on the WTO Appellate 
Body.175  There is a serious risk that without a new shared narrative to direct trade policy going forward the 
system could unravel.176   
A re-embedded liberalism based around a state’s obligation to provide for its own people is a 
normative narrative that might be able to capture current discontent with international trade and direct trade 
negotiations going forward.  It is not an attempt to “save” the current system, but to justify a modified system 
going forward.  Many of the policies floated here are likely infeasible in the near political future.  Some of 
these proposals may be hard to square with current WTO obligations (particularly MFN obligations to offer 
all members any benefit offered to any other state).  The goal here though is not to prescribe articles for 
current negotiations but to imagine what alternative negotiations might look when directed by a different 
normative narrative.  To the extent that such a narrative is possible, it will require an active effort to re-center 
the discourse within international economic law, in international organizations, and/or domestic politics.    
 
 
 
                                                 
172 See, e.g., Ahmed Al-Omran, Saudi Arabia Freezes Trade with Canada and Expels Ambassador, FINANCIAL TIMES, August 6, 
2018.  
173 See, e.g., Ryohei Yasoshima, US-South Korea Steel Deal Tests WTO Rules, NIKKEI ASIAN REV., March 27, 2018 07:46 JST, 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/US-South-Korea-steel-deal-tests-WTO-rules. 
174 See generally Joseph H. H. Weiler, Editorial: Black Lies, White Lies and Some Uncomfortable Truths in and of the International 
Trading System, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 339 (2018). 
175 See, e.g., Brewster, supra note 111; Manfred Elsig, Mark Pollack, & Gregory Shaffer, Monkey Cage: Trump Is Fighting An 
Open War On Trade. His Stealth War On Trade May Be Even More Important, WASH. POST. September 27, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/09/27/trump-is-fighting-an-open-war-on-trade-his-
stealth-war-on-trade-may-be-even-more-important/?utm_term=.c558006b5721. 
176 See Hoekman & Douglas, supra note 9, at 21 (“If the organic link between civil society and the market cannot be 
restabilized, there is a very real prospect that the 21st Century story of trade agreements will be a story of reversal.”).  
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